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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF MUNICIPAL
DEBTS.
[Second part]
MONEYS IN THE TRASURY.

The act of April 20th, 1874, as we have seen, directs that
the net amount of indebtedness of a municipality only shall be
considered as the indebtedness, increase of which is restrained,
and it requires that this net indebtedness shall be ascertained by
deducting from the gross amount of the debt "the money in the
If A has $1,000 and owes $1,000 we are not in the
treasury."
habit of saying that he is not in debt. There is no very philosophical reason for distinguishing between property of a city in the
form of money, and its property in the form of buildings, lands,
etc. If the money in the treasury is applied to the proposed
debt, so as to qualify it to be contracted, other unavoidable expenses will need to be met from additional revenues. However,
the direction of the statute is uniformly observed, and money
in the treasury, capable of being applied to the existing debt,
or to the proposed increase is deducted from it'. A contract for a
sewer stipulating for the payment of $9,300 "out of the general
sewer fund" the court assumed that that fund was sufficient to
pay it, in the absence of an averment in a case stated, that it was
insufficient.'
If the money in the treasury of a school district is
the product of a loan whose validity is contested because of its
'Addyston Pipe Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa.41; Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa.
72; Spangler v. Gallagher 182 Pa. 277; Dolan vs. School District, 10 Dist.
694.
2Addyston Pipe Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41.
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alleged excess beyond 2 per centum of the valuation, it cannot
be treated as legitimately in the treasury and applicable to debts,
other than the bonds for which it was paid in. The school district must return the money in good faith, the bonds being void'.
ALL OUTSTANDING SOLVENT DEBTS.

The 5th section of the act of April 20th, 1874, directs the
subtraction of "all outstanding solvent debts" from the gross
indebtedness, in order to ascertain the size of the debt, with a
view to determine whether it exceeds 2 per centum or 7 per centum of the valuation. These solvent debts are debts due by solvent debtors to' the city, borough, county, etc., the legality of
whose increase of debt is in question'. The county, e.g. may
have certain credits for taxes with the state e.g. $30,000 due from
the state treasurer,' a credit of $323,943.18 from the state for
overpayments of taxes on watches and money at interest
Taxes, assessed in previous years and still due, or collectable,
are to be considered as assets, available for the discharge of
debts, and their amount will, like other solvent debts, be deducted from the gross debt. Thus $13,000 overdue taxes were
so deducted in Spangler v. Gallagher'. If a school district has
lost a part of its territory, by the creation out of a part of it, of
a borough and new school district and the latter is bound to pay
the former a sum of money on account of a disproportionate
amount of school property embraced within the new district, this
money may be regarded as reducing the indebtedness of the
original district, although the question of what the new district
owes to the old, is still undecided by the auditor.9
ASSETS IN THn SINKING FUND.

The act of 1874 makes it the duty of cities that are indebted
to provide a sinking fund for the final extinction of the debt.
3

Luburg's Appeal, 1 Mona. 329.

In Davis v. Braddock 48 Pitts. 145,

Evans J.defines the debt of the constituency to be that which one is
bound to pay to another, irrespective of his ability to pay. He suggests
that "net" debt is not the expression used, that the money in the treasury
may be spent in other ways than that of reducing the debt, and the revenue of the year may likewise be so spent.
4
Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. 72.
5111 Pa. 72.
6
Spangler v. Gallagher. 182 Pa. 277.
7
Brown's Appeal 111 Pa. 72.

aid.
9

Dolan v. Lackawanna Township School Dist. 694.
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The city may from time to time buy its own certificates of indebtedness, or its bonds, and place them in the sinking fund.
When it does so the indebtedness has been l5ro tanto extinguished,
whether the certificates or bonds have been cancelled or not.
Of the as yet uncancelled debt of Philadelphia, being $52,758,845.22, $23,130,100 were in the sinking fund having been purchased by the city's money. In order to ascertain the actual
debt with a view to deciding whether a proposed increase was
within the proposed 7 per centum limit it was necessary to deduct
the latter sum from the former'o. But for some reason, it is
suggested by Dean J. that other securities than those of the city,
and money in the sinking fund, cannot be subtracted from the
debt. As to these last he says "obviously they remain in the
fund bound by the inviolable pledge which attached to them
when they first became part of it. So far as concerns them, they
have not yet been applied in payment or redemption of any part
of the funded debt. An asset of the city, easily convertible into
cash, they undoudtedly are, but as yet they have not operated
to the reduction of the funded debt, to which purpose they are
pledged. In effect they only represent the savings of the city,
set aside in anticipation of payment of the debt; as to any actual
reduction of the debt by them, there has been none. The debt
is still an outstanding liability unaffected by the savings, with
only an increased ability on part of the city to pay; an increase
in ability measured by the cash value of the savings. When
used in purchase of the debt, there is a release of the pledge,
and a discharge of the obligation, to the amount of the purchase."
If "moneys in the treasury," "solvent debts" owed to the city,
all revenues applicable within the year to debt, are to be subtracted from the gross debt it is difficult to see why money or
the equivalent, in the sinking fund, shall not be subtracted.
TrHz VALUATION.

The 8th section of Article ix of the Constitution of 1874,
enacts that "the debt of any city * * * shall never exceed
7 per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property
therein; nor shall any municipality or district incur any new
debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding 2 per centum upon such assessed valuation of property, without the assent
1

Brooks v. Phila. 162 Pa. 123. Houston v. Lancaster, 191 Pa. 143;
Pepper v. Philada. 181 Pa. 566; Bruce v. Pittsburgh, 166 Pa. 152.
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o'f the electors", etc. The property in a city may be assessed at
)ne amount for city purposes, and at a different amount greater
or less, for county purposes. In such case, which of the valuitions furnishes the standard for determining whether a debt is or
.s not permissible? Legislation applicable to cities of the second
-lass, the act of May 5th, 1876, P. L. 124, provides for a board
)f city assessors, who are to make an assessment. In doing so
they take as a basis the assessments returned by the ward assessors to the county commissioners. They have power to raise,
equalize or alter such assessments by increasing or reducing
them. "When said board shall have altered and amended the
list of all taxable property, so as to arrive at its true cash valuation, they shall then ascertain the aggregate amount of the
value of the entire taxable property of said city, which shall remain the lawful valuation for purposes of city taxation." This
city valuation, whether it be greater or less than the county valuation, is the valuation, 2 per cent, or 7 per centum of which
is intended by the constitution." That the city authorities, in
order to increase their borrowing power, may fictitiously increase
the county valuation is evident. If it appeared that they had
done so, what the result would be, is not visible. The mere fact
that the one valuation is higher than the other, warrants no inference that the city valuation is too high. The county valuation may as readily be too low.'"
The 29th section of the act of May 8th, 1854, provides that
the adjusted valuation for county purposes shall be furnished by
the county commissioners to the school directors, and shall be the
basis of taxation for school purposes. A levy by the school
controllers upon an assessment made by the ward assessors in
1889 would not be a valid assessment. It should be made on the
valuation of 1888, adjusted by the county commissioners." The
assessed valuation of property in a township, as fixed and returned by the assessors to the county commissioners was $4,193,521. The commissioners, as a board of revision, reduced the
amount to $1,050,124. The latter is probably the valuation
which would be regulative of the borrowing power of the township
"'Bruce v. Pittsburg; 166 Pa. 152; Dupont v. Pittsburg, 69 Fed. Rep. 13.
12Id.
"3Witherop v. Titusville School Board, 7 C. C. 451.

1'4Plains Township's Appeal 21 Super. 68.
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VALUATION WAY INCLUDE OCCUPATIONS.

The constitution and statutes speak of the "assessed value
of the taxable property", the "assessed valuation of property",
but other things than property in the usual sense of that term,
occupation, for example, may be made a subject cf taxation.
May the taxdble value of occupations be included in the assessed
valuation? In Brown's Appeal'5 the assessed valuation of Allegheny county was found to be $240,100,244. It embraced however, occupations. Excluding these, it would have been $198,382, 414.25. It was proposed to create a new debt by the erection of a court house, which debt added to preexisting debt
would make an aggregate debt less than 2 per centum upon the
actual valuation, but more than 2 per centum upon the valuation from which occupations were eliminated. The creation of
the new debt, without a vote of the electors was held permissible.
If occupations are sources of revenue, under the exercise of the
taxing power, there seems to be no good reason for excluding
the valuation of them from the "assessed valuation" of the
constitution.
THE VARIABLENSS OF THU VALUATION.

The constitution forbids that a municipal debt should ever
"exceed 7 per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable
property;" or that a debt "exceeding 2 per centum upon such
assessed valuation of property" should be incurred without the
consent of the electors. The act of April 20th, 1874, and the
act of April 13th, 1897, define the valuation as "the last preceding assessed valuation." After a debt is contracted, its ratio
to any particular valuation may be increased or decreased, in
consequence of variations in these valuations from the one immediately preceding the formation of the debt. Such variations
are ignored. If the debt was valid when contracted, it is not
made invalid by a subsequent reduction of the assessment; if invalid, it does not become valid because of any subsequent increase of the assessment.18 The property in a city, borough, etc.
may fluctuate in value, or new methods of appraisement may in15111 Pa. 72.
1

60n Sept. 30, 1891, Corry's debt was in excess of 7 per cent of the valuation, which was $1,359,096. The debt was $122,300. Since April, 1898,
the valuation is $1,685,077; the debt is $98,000. But the validity of a debt

contracted Sept. 30th, 1891, must be determined by the facts then existing,
Addyston Pipe Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41.
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dicate a difference in value; or the municipality may suffer reduction of area". The reduction of the area of a school district,
increasing the ratio of its debt to the value of the property in
the reduced area, would not impair a previously created debt"8 .
TIMIE BY REEERENCE TO WHICH VALIDITY OF DFBT IS DBTERMINABLU.

A contract may impose an instant and unconditional duty
to pay money now, or a duty to pay unconditionally at a future
time or times. It may impose a duty to pay money at a future
time or at future times, if certain things shall, at the arrival of
these times, have been done by the other party to the contract.
It is said generally, that the validity of a contract must be determined when the determination is made subsequently, ds of
the time the contract was made. 9 The facts then existing only,
may be considered. If the debt is payable the year of its making,
and the revenues of that year, properly expectable, will be sufficient to pay it together with the other usual expenses, no improper debt is contracted, however large the existing debt may
be. Suppose the debt created is payable in installments, e.g., it
arises from a lease of land, the rental from which is to be paid
each year. If the revenues of the first year will be enough to
pay the rent of that year, and those of the second year, will
probably be enough to pay the rent of that year, etc., is the debt
a permissible one, without regard to the aggregate debt of the
municipality? In Booth v. Weiss' the city of Philadelphia contracted with Weiss for the use by it of an engine house for*10
years, at a certain yearly rental. Mitchell J. refrained from
considering whether city councils could make a contract for rent
to be paid out of the current revenues of the future years, so as
to bind future councils to raise and appropriate the money, and
thus in effect increase the debt which their revenues must pay,
17Plains Township Appeal 21 Super. 68.
1
sParker Township School District v. Bruin Borough School District.
13 Dist. 769. "If", says Mitchell J.,"a city at the time of making a contract,
levies a special tax in good faith supposed to be adequate to meet it, but
in consequence of fire or flood or decline in values, the result is an insufficient fund," the contract good when made, would not become bad; Addyson Pipe Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41.
' 9Addyston Pipe Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41. Hence an increase
of the amount of property in a city, since the contraction of the debt, or
the reduction of the debt since, cannot be regarded.
2015 Philadelphia 159.
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because the contract in question pertained to the ordinary expenses of the city, and the annual revenues were sufficient over
and above the ordinary expenses of the city government to meet
the rent proposed to be paid. The court refused to declare the
contract void, and to restrain payment of the rent, observing
that the rent, whose payment was objected to, is for property
now occupied by the city, for a purpose which is part of its
ordinary administration of government; that the money to pay
the rent of the current year has been duly appropriated by councils,
and that it is now, actually or potentially in the city treasury.
Under these circumstances, it refused to "speculate on the consequences of a different state of facts possible to arise hereafter."
"For the present" said the court, "it is sufficient that there is
no case for the intervention of a court of equity." In Miller v.
Pittsburg2 it was thought important that contracts made in 1900
for work and materials in the erection of a school building, not
completed that year, nor the following, were within the limit of
current revenue in taxes [of what year is not clear, probably of
that during which, by the completion of the work, the money
would become payable] and that the levy heretofore made was
sufficient to pay the contracts in full "as they will from time
to time be performed," besides the current expenses of the school
district. A contract for electric light for 7 years, at a cost of
$1600 per year, was held valid, because the annual payment was
within the current revenues, that is, apparently would -continue
to be for the remaining six years, within the revenues. The
continuance of the revenue at its present magnitude, was apparently postulated."
CASUS HOLDING A CONTINUOUS CONTRACT INVALID.

There are cases which hold that contracts for payments
ranging over a number of years, are not valid because each annual payment is within the revenue of the year. A contract
for the construction of water-works for the city, at a cost of
$6,000 annually for 20 years provided that the payments should
be made annually from the current revenues of the city (and
not otherwise,) and that, if the revenues should be insufficient,
the interest of the city in the works should revert to the con21201 Pa. 397.
22

'Wade v. Oakmont Borough 165 Pa. 479. In Rainsburg Borough v.
Fagan. 127 Pa. 74, costs and fees in certain suits were a valid debt, for
which bonds could be issued.
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tractor. It was held invalid, as making a debt in excess 'of 2
per centum of the valuation, without a popular vote. Apparently conceding that if the contract had pertained to ordinary
expenses for a term of years, and if the amount annually payable
under it could have been paid from current revenues, it would
have been valid, the contract for water-works was not deemed
one for ordinary expenses.2" A contract for the erection of a
school building, for the sum of $148,970, which stipulated that
it should create no debt to K, the builder, except for work and
materials furnished, of the value of the funds legally available
to the school board for building purposes, at the time of the
making of the contract, and that work should cease as soon as
there should be no such available funds, was held to create a debt
in excess of the school district's power. "If," says Miller, P. J.,
"there were nothing more in. these contracts than to provide for
the district's ordinary expenses, within the current revenues, the
conclusion of Wade v. Oakmont Borough, 165 Pa. 479, might be
applicable, but the erection of this school building is an'extraordinary expense."" A contract between the city of Erie and R
provided that R should erect a market house; that the city
should use it, paying, for 25 years, an annual rental equal to six
per cent of the cost; and that the city might within the 25 years
purchase the building. An illegal debt was held to be created,
the city indebtedness already exceeding 7 per cent of the valuation of property. It is assumed that the current revenues were
not enough to yield $1,500, the annual rental, in addition to
what was already necessary for the current expenses.'
THE STATeMeNT.

The act of April 13th, 1897, P. L. 18b (3 Stewart, 2722,)
aBrown v. City of Corry, 175 Pa. 528. Possibly "ordinary municipal
operations may be carried on, although debts in excess of 2 per centum
are thereby created. At all events, if debts are thus created, in excess of
2 per cent, they can be lawfully paid out of the proceeds of bonds, which
are issued with the assent of the electors; Roye v. Columbia Borough, 192
Pa. 146.
24
McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85.
aAppeal of City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398.
bA similar provision is in the act of April 20th, 1874, which requires
the statement to give "the amount of the annual taxes levied
Witherop v. Titusville
and assessed to pay the said indebtedness."
School Board, 7 C.C. 451; Rainsburg v. Fyan 127 Pa. 74.
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provides that a municipality may increase its debt, or incur debt,
so that the aggregate shall not exceed 2 percentum of the valuation, by a vote of the corporate authorities, duly recorded upon
its minutes. It may also issue coupon bonds or other securities
therefor. Before issuing' any such obligation or security 8 it
shall be the duty of the principal officer or officers of the municipality to prepare a statement showing its actual indebtedness,
the amount of the last preceding valuation of the taxable property, the amount of debt to be incurred, the form, number and
date of maturity of the obligations to be issued. This statement must have appended to it, the oath or affirmation of the
officer who makes it. It must be filed in the office of the clerk
of the court of quarter sessions. The statement should be filed
not merely before issuing the obligations or securities, but before,
after offering them to the public, contracting with any one to
sell them to him. Hence, if the bonds are offered to the public,
before such a statement is filed, and they are sold to R for a price
which is above par, the sale will not be obligatory on the city,
or, at least if the mayor refuses to sign the bonds, he will not
at the instance of R be compelled by mandamus to sign them.
The object of the statement is to furnish possible buyers of the
bonds full and accurate information in advance of the bidding,
of the resources and liabilities of the city.' And the school district or other municipality will probably be restrained from carrying out a contract which involves the creation of the debt, e.g.
the erection of a school house, and the issue of bonds, if the
statement has not been filed.' There can, also, be no recovery
upon a bond issued by a borough, there having been no stateaThe statement does not need to precede the creation of a debt, but
only the issue of bonds. Rainsburg v. Tyan, 127 Pa. 74. ButHenderson
P. J. thought the statement should precede -the creation of the debt;
Witherop v. School District, 7CC, 451.
*In Bank v. Schuylkill County, 190 Pa. 188itwas tacitly assumed that
the issue by the county of an unsealed note for $20,000, if it increased the
debt would need to be preceded by the filing of the statement. When
there was no evidence at the trial on the question of the filing of the statement, there will be no reason for arresting judgment on the verdict
against the county. But, in 127 Pa. 74, it is said that the plaintiff in a
suit on a bond against a borough must be taken, in the absence of an
averment by him to the contrary to have known that the statement had
not been filed.
2
TLyon v. Ripple, 4 Kulp, 59.
"Winthrop v. Titusville School Board 7 C.C. 451.
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ment filed prior to its issue. If the money obtained on the bond
however, was used in discharging a valid debt, the bond-holder
can recover the amount paid for the bond and thus used.'
If
bonds are issued, without a statement in the quarter sessions, but
for a valid debt, they can be lawfully taken up by bonds or the
proceeds of bonds issued later and in compliance with law."0 If by
a bill to enjoin against issue of bonds and to require surrender
of any already issued, it appears that the statement has not been
filed, and but for this neglect there would be no valid objection
to the issue of the bonds the court may give leave to file the
statement and, it being filed, may refrain from enjoining."'
WHAT THE STATEMENT MUST CONTAIN.

The required constituents of the statement have already
been described. One of them is the "actual indebtedness." This
should be stated upon knowledge. If stated as a result of guess
or manifestly unreliable information, the filing of the statement
will not authorize the issue of bonds. A school board by resolution directed its president to file in the office of the clerk of
quarter sessions a statement that designated the indebtedness as
$9,400. There was indeed no deliberation upon or investigation
of the debt. The minutes covering the period during which the
debt was claimed to have been made, were not produced at the
meeting. They were not in the possession of the board or of any
member or official thereof. The averment that the debt was
$9,400 was based on the president's assertion, his assertion was
founded on the fact that all persons having claims against the
school district, baving by advertisement been requested to report
them, certain claims had been presented which, without investigation, the clerk, the attorney of the board, the tax-collector,
the president of the board and another member of it, had in the
absence of other members of the board (six in all) and not a
regular called meeting thereof, assumed to be correct. No
member had actual knowledge that the district had received value
"Rainsburg Borough v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74. He sued for the interest
of the bond, only. As the court of quarter sessions has nothing to do
concerning the statement, a remonstrance against it filed there, will be
stricken off. Laird v. Greensburg, 8 C.C. 621. There is no adjudication
upon the statement, the statute authorizes none; Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. 435.
"'School

District v. Lamprecht Bro. Co. 195 Pa. 504.

$Sener v. Ephrata Borough, 176 Pa. 80. There was however another
and insuperable obstacle to the issue of the bonds.
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for the debt, or how it had been authorized. The president and
B. a member, had arived at the amount by conjecture, and the
other members accepted this statement. The court enjoined
against the issue of the bonds."
UTILITY OF THE STATEMENT.

In Pike County v. Rowland" the county had issued bonds,
for the raising of money with which to purchase a bridge. They
increased the debt beyond 2 per centum, and there had been no
vote of the people. It does not appear that a statement had been
filed in the office of the clerk of the quarter sessions. The holder
of the bonds sued -n them for the interest. A point was not
improperly refused apparently, by the trial court, to the effect
that having been treasurer of the county when the bonds were
issued, the plaintiff, who was the person to whom the bonds were
first issued, was chargeable with knowledge of the fact that the
debt of the county exceeded two per centum of the valuation,
and for that reason could not recover."s The purchaser of a bond,
negotiable in form, is not acquitted of the duty of knowing
whether the statement has been filed or not. The omission to
file the statement, or its inadequacy, will not estop the county,
city, etc. from contesting the validity of the issue of the bonds;
on account, e.g. of the absence of a vote of the people. 5 The statement showed the debt, at the time of the issue of the bonds, to
be $4,332.74. If this debt existed on January 1st, 1874 the increase of debt later in the same year, did not need a vote of the
people; if it was created since January 1st, 1874, the later increase, being in excess of 2 percentum, was invalid without a
vote of the people. As the debt stated in the statement was
more than 2 per centum, any purchaser of bonds was advised
by it that they were invalid, without a popular vote, unless that
preexisting debt had arisen before the going into effect of the
constitution. The burden is upon, the buyer of the bond to
inquire as to the popular vote or as to the origin of the debt
"2Mason v. School District, 10 Kulp, 563. The people who must pay
are entitled to know what they are paying for. When the correctness
of the statement is attacked by a bill to enjoin against the issue of bonds
the burden is on the school directors to support it.
394 Pa. 238.
I'Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. 435.
3
1d.
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before or since January 1st, 1874."
The statement was required
by the act of April 20th, 1874, to show the annual tax levied and
assessed to pay the indebtedness. Perhaps, if it averred the
levy and assessment of such a tax, a purchaser of a bond could
rely on the averment, even although it was untrue. 7 The truth
of the averments of the statement may be safely assumed by the
purchaser of bonds issued subsequently to the filing of it. The
statement, e.g. avering that the tax had been levied for their
payment, the issue of bonds could not be assailed as invalid, by
showing that in fact no such tax had been levied. "The only
purpose" says Stewart P. J., "in requiring a certificate to be
filed, is that parties before contracting for such indebtedness
may inform themselves as to its regularity. To require them to
consult such a notice, invite them to act .upon it, and then deny
them its protection, by allowing the- municipality to assert that
the notice was not true in point of fact, would be dishonesty of
the rankest kind."
The law sets no such traps. The holders
of these bonds were held to knowledge of what the statements
contained, but beyond that they were not bound to inquire" .
The statement of a school district setting forth all the statutory
requirements, the assessed valuation, the absence of debt, that
the proposed debt was $5,000, which was less than 2 percentum;
of the valuation, and that an annual tax of 2 mills was assessed
for the payment of the debt, in an action on a bond, the school
district was estopped from denying that the tax had been duly
levied, or from alleging that the debt exceeded $5,000.' s
WHEN STATEMENT IS UNNECESSARY

When debts are incurred from day to day or week to week
which the year's taxes, when coliected, will be sufficient to pay,
the money with which to pay them may, in the early part of the
year, in anticipation of the collection of the tax, be borrowed
witholit the filing of the statement ; that is, ordinary expenses
of a class which often recurs, may be met by loans made for a
short time, which loans will be able to be paid, and it is the intention to pay from the taxes, later collected, of the same year.3
3

1Rainsburg Borough v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74. If the statement makes
no averment on the subject, and no provision for the tax was in fact
made, the bond would be unenforceable.
"78Bell v. Waynesborough 195 Pa. 299.
1 Parker Township School District v. School District, 13 Dist. 769.
39
Commissioners of Schuylkill Co. v. Snyder, 20 Pa. C. C. 649. An
amended statement may be filed; Laird v. Greensburg, 8 C. C. 624
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MOOT COURT
PRIM vs. MANLOVE.
Deed-Parol defeasance-Resulting Trust.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On May 5th, 1909, Prim borrowed $2,000 from Manlove, on a note for
that amount. He at the same time conveyed two farms to Manlove, as
he says, as collateral security for the loan; as Manlove says, in payment
of a pre-existing debt. With the $2,000 Prim bought a third farm, and
caused the conveyance to be made to Manlove. The purpose of this conveyance is alleged by Prim to be to secure the payment of the $2,000 loan;
by Manlove to pay with the two other tracts a pre-existing debt. Manlove has had possession of the three tracts, and has sold $2,800 worth of
timber from them, $1,200 worth of hay. For some reason, Prim has
tendered the $2,000 borrowed, and demanded a conveyance of the three
farms. Manlove refusing to convey, Prim files this bill to compel him.
FOLEY for plaintiff.
PARSONS for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRENNAN, J. By the facts of this case it appears that the plaintiff was the owner of two farms situated in Center county. Being desirous of purchasing a third farm, situated in same county, he applied to
defendant for the loan of $2,000, executing his promissory note therefor.
This money he used in purchasing the third farm. As security for the
payment of this loan, Prim alleges that he has conveyed the two farms
mentioned, by deeds absolute on their face, to Manlove, and at the same
time has had the deed for the third farm executed in the name of Manlove.
Prim contends at the time these conveyances were made, it was orally
agreed between him and Manlove, that upon the payment of the note he,
Manlove, should reconvey to him, or to any person he might designate.
Manlove, in his answer to the bill denies that he entered into any
agreement with Prim as to the reconveyance of the property in question.
He contends that at the time the conveyances were made, Prim owed
him $6,000 and that he believed the conveyances were made in settlement
of this debt.
It is made to appear from the statement of this case, that both the
testimony of plaintiff and defendant, is all corroborated.
Plaintiff in this case files this bill for an accounting and for a decree
compelling Manlove to reconvey the property to him, Prim contending,
inter alia, that as to the first two properties Manlove should be deemed
a trustee ex-malificio, and as to the third farm, that there is a resulting
trust in favor of plaintiff.
In the case of Grove v. Kase, 195 Pa. 325, which we deem a case on
all forms with the case at bar, the facts were as follows: The plainitff,
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a brother of defendant, conveyed by deed absolute on. its face, all right
title and interest in certain real estate of which he was the owner, to
defendant. By an alleged parol agreement it was agreed that defendant
should hold the land in question until she should pay herself a certain
debt owing to her from plaintiff, from the royalties of the land conveyed,
after which she was to reconvey to plaintiff, which she refuse 4 to do,
whereupon plaintiff filed a bill in equity for an accounting and reconveyance. Held: That plAintiff was not entitled to recover.
In the case at bar the facts are identical with those of the case above
cited.
The statement of facts does not set forth that such an agreement as
plaintiff avers was, or was not, actually made; for the present, we shall
assume plaintiff's allegations correctly state the facts. The legal question, therefore, is, whether upon such an agreement the plaintiff can
successfully rest his prayer for a decree.
There are two aspects in which the transactions may be regarded,
First: the deed may be really a mortgage, the defeasance being in parol.
This is the natural conclusion; indeed, it is difficult to avoid the decision
that the transaction could be of no other character.
In order to secure defendant for the payment of a certain sum of
money, plaintiff made a conveyance of real estate by deeds absolute on
its face, but qualified by parol agreement that after defendant should be
paid from the sale of the timber on the land, the land should be reconveyed. In our opinion this was a pledge of real estate to secure the
payment of money and the discharge of a pecuniary obligation, and was
so clearly a mortgage that a discussion is likely to obscure the conclusion.
If it was a mortgage the act of 1881 P. L. 84 lies equally in Plaintiff's
road to relief. It provides expressly "that no defeasance to any deed
for real estate regular and absolute upon its face, made after the passage of this act, shall have the effect of reducing it to a mortgage, unless
the said defeasance is made at the time the deed is made, and is in writing, signed, sealed, and acknowledged, and delivered by grantee to grantor and is recorded within 60 days from the execution thereof."
All the requirements set forth by the act must be strictly complied
with to give the defeasance validity. Sankey v. Hawley, 118 Pa. 30;
Molly v. Ulrich 133 Pa. 41.
The plaintiff in this case has failed to comply with any of the provisions of said act, and for that reason no validity can be given to the
parol ?fefeasance.
The other aspect in which the agreement may be considered is urged
by the complainant. He insists that the parole contract to reconvey
imposes a trust ex maleficio upon the transaction, which should now be
enforced by a decree for account and reconveyance.
Unfortunately for this position it has been expressly decided in numerous cases that the breach of a parol contract is not of itself sufficient to warrant a court in fastening a trust ex maleficio upon the original conveyance. There must be proof of fraud at the time the deed was
executed-of fraud inducing and influencing the grantor to part with his
title-otherwise such a trust cannot arise. Salter v. Bird 103 Pa. 436;
Barry v. Hill, 166 Pa. 344; Martin v. Baird, 175 Pa. 540. In the case at.
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bar we find at the most, nothing more than the breach of a parol agreement. In the case cited by complainant, Goodwin v. McMinn 193 Pa.
646, it was proven that there was a fraud practiced with plaintiff from
the beginning of the transaction. In the present controversy, fraud is
not alleged nor is it proven that defendant secured the transfer through
fraud. We therefore find as a fact that defendant was guilty of no
fraud in securing the transfer by deed. The case relied upon by comcomplainant'and the present case, differ in this one very important element, and for that reason the case cited can have no effectin our decision
of the present case.
This finding of fact, viz., the absence of fraud, in connection with
the rule of law above referred to, is conclusive against Prim's right, for
the assumed agreement (even if actually made) would not without proof
of fraud support the decree now asked. Besides, the alleged agreement
is not proven by the evidence of the necessary quality. The rule upon
this subject is well settled. Before upon a deed absolute on its face can
be imposed a parol trust ex maleficio, the evidence must be clear, precise, and indubitable, and must proceed from at least two witnesses or one
with corroboratiug circumstances. Wallace v. Smith, 155 Pa. 78. Burr
vs. Kase 168 Pa. 81. In this case it appears the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant was corroborated. Therefore we are of the opinion
that the plaintiff has not made out his case as required by the above
stated positive rule of law. That in fact no parol agreement was proved.
If the parol agreement was made as averred by plaintiff, either the
transaction was a mortgage, and in this event the parol defeasance cannot be enforced because it violates the act of 1881, or the agreement created a trust by parol and in this event the trust cannot be enforced because it violates the act of 1856 P. L. 533 sec. 4, which provides that all
declarations of trust in land shall be in -writing. (2) No trust ex maleficio has been shown to exist.
In order to establish a trust ex maleficio the fraud must be in the
transaction from the beginning. It is true it may be shown by subsequent acts; but we find no such act of defendant as would sustain the
inference, that at the time of the conveyance defendant possessed a
fraudulent intention.
The foregoing discussion applies to the first two parcels of land conveyed. We come now to consider the effect of the third conveyance, viz:
the taking of the title in the name of Manlove, when the purchase price was
paid by Prim with money borrowed from Manlove.
Where one borrows money from another, and pays it on articles for
the purchase of lands, and the title to the land is taken in the name of
the lender of the money to secure the money borrowed, the money is
that of the borrower and there is a resulting trust in his favor in the
lender. Howe v. Bates 21 Pa., C.C. 570; P. & L. Dig. Decisions Col.
38049.
In ths case of McDonough y. McNeill 113 Mass. 92, Chief Justice
Gray says: "Where land convejyed by one person to another is paid for
by the money of a third, a trust results to the latter by implication of
law, which is not within the statute of Frauds." It is sufficient if the
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purchase money was lent to him by the grantee, provided the loan was
clearly proved. Jackson v. Stevens 112 Mass 96.
Where the purchase price is paid by one and title taken in the name
of another, a trust results in favor of the one paying the money. Bispham's Equity, page 80.
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing principles of law and
authorities cited and in order that the equities of the case be worked
out, it is decreed: That as to the first two parcels of land no recovery
can be had, as the transaction violates the act of 1881. Secondly; That
Manlove, the delendant is hereby declared to be a trustee of the third
piece of land, as trustee in a resulting trust in favor of Prim who paid
the purchase price, also that Manlove account for same.
Decree entered accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The evidence tendered by the plaintiff, if not qualified by that of the
defendant, would show that Prim bought a farm and paid $2,000 for it.
Although he had obtained the money as a loan, from Manlove, it was
his money. He had become owner of it by giving a promissory note for
it. The conveyance was however made to Manlove. From these facts
a trust would result to Prim.
It would be competent for Manlove to rebut the trust by showing
that the parties intended that no trust should arise: that, for instance,
Prim intended to make a gift of the land, or that he intended to pay by
it a debt which he owed to Manlove, or that he intended the land to be
held by Manlove as security for the repayment of money borrowed.
Apparently, Manlove's evidence tends to show that the conveyance
was made to him as payment of a pre-existing debt. The learned court
below has not credited it, and we cannot say that it has therein committed
an error.
The plaintiff might have relied on the presumption of a trust. He
however has not chosen to do so. He repudiates the hypothesis that the
land was conveyed to Manlove under such circumstances that Manlove
holds the land as a trustee for him. He admits that it was intended to be
beneficial to Manlove, to be a security for money borrowed from Manlove. We do not see how the resulting trust being thus repudiated by
the alleged cestui que trust we can affirm its existence.
What Prim avers is that he directed his vendor to make the conveyance of the tract to Manlove, as security for the loan. Had the vendor
conveyed to Prim, and had Prim then conveyed to Manlove the transaction would have been equivalent to the direct conveyance at Prim's instance, by the vendor to Manlove. We think that whatever would make
unassertable the reception by Manlove of the land as collateral security,
had it been conveyed to him by Prim, ought to prevent the assertion
that he received it from Prim's vendor as such security.
The act of June 8th, 1881, amended by that of April 23d, 1909, P.L. 137,
provides that "No defeasan ce to any deed for real estate, regular and
absolute upon the face, made after the passage of this act, shall have the
effect of reducing it to a mortgage, unless the said defeasance is in
writing, signed and delivered by the grantee in the deed to the grantor."
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The object of the statute was to prevent the fraudulent setting up
of defeasances, with the effect of impairing the apparent absolute titles of
grantees. Although like the statute of frauds it may itself be the cause
of frightful frauds it is to be hoped that it will prevent more frauds than it
occasions. Whether it will or not, we cannot know. Its predecessor,
the act of 1881, has been carried out by the courts, despite the probably villainous use of it by grantees, in some cases. Sankey v. Hawley 118 Pa.
30; Cf. Molly v. Ulrich, 133 Pa. 41; Grove v. Kase, 195 Pa. 325; Sterck
v. Germantown Co. 27 Super 336; O'Connor v. Decker, 30 Super, 579;
Lohrer v. Russell, 207 Pa. 105; Guaranty Co v. Linton, 213 Pa. 105. The
act of 1909 is an improvement upon that of 1881. It does not require the
defeasance to be sealed or to be made simultaneously with the delivery
of the deed, absurd and shocking requirements of the act of 1881. It no
longer requires, in order to bind the grantee, (as distinguished from his
subsequent grantee or mortgagee, who has no notice of thq defeasance)
that the defeasance should be acknowledged and recorded; nor, even in
order to bind the grantee's grantee, that it should be acknowledged at
the time of delivery and recorded within 60 days thereafter. The act of
1909 however is as peremptory as that of 1881, with respect to the necessity that the defeasance should, at some time, be written and signed by
the grantee.
The learned court below has correctly decided that the act of 1909
makes unenforceable, the alleged parol defeasance to the conveyance
made directly by Prim to Manlove.
It has skillfully and benevolently sought to enable the plaintiff to
recover the tract which was conveyed by Prim's vendor to Manlove. In
view of the ability of the opinion, we regret our being unable to follow
it. The plaintiff, as it seems to us, rejects the theory of a resulting
trust, and asserts that of a mortgage. His evidence tends to show, and
but for the act of 1909 would be sufficient to show, that the tract was
conveyed to Manlove primarily to secure the repayment of a loan. Finding the legal obstacle to the enforcement of his right of defeasance,
under this view, it is not legitimate for the court to make a case for Prim
different from that which his evidence tends to support and different, also,
from that which the defendant's tends to support.
It is necessary to modify the decree of the learned court below, and
to direct the dismissal of the bill in toto.
Decree reversed and bill dismissed.

SAXTON V. AMES, EXECUTOR OF SCARLETT
Assumpsit for Attorney's Fees for Defending an Action Against
the Executor for a Debt of the Estate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
An alleged creditor of Scarlett sued Ames, as executor, for the debt
$3,000. Ames employed Saxton as attorney to defend him. The effect
of the defense was to reduce the claim received to $450. Saxton demanded $800 compensation, and the evidence indicated that this was a
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reasonable fee. Ames has been discharged as a bankrupt, Saxton's
claim, if he had any against him, having been provable against his estate.
This is a suit against the estate.
DIPPLE,
STRAUSS,

for plaintiff.
for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

PARSONS, J.-There are two questions involved in this case: (1)
Whether the plaintiff, Saxton, can recover from the estate of Scarlett,
or (2) whether he must bring his action against the executor, Ames, the
man who personally employed him.
The general duties of an executor or administrator as defined by the
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, are "to bury the decedent,
collect his effects, preserve them from waste, pay claims against the
estate, and distribute the residue, if any, among those entitled, and to do
all the things necessary as the representative of the personal estate of
the decedent."
As the facts, stated above, are given, it is plain that the act of Ames,
as executor of Scarlett, in employing Saxton, was, not for the mere help
or benefit it would give him, but for the express benefit to the estate
that Ames was executor of. The reducing of the alleged creditor of
Scarlett's claim from $3,000 to $450, was of no benefit, either directly or
indirectly to Ames, but it was of great benefit to the estate. Thus we
see that the services, as shown by the complaint, to be ultimately and
wholly for the estate, and in no manner for his benefit personally. Conceding that the foregoing is true, the question now for us to decide is,
who is responsible for the attorney's fees, the estate of Scarlett, or Ames
as executor of Scarlett? In looking over this question, we have found
that the weight of authority seems to rest to the latter, namely, that the
executor or administrator of an estate is liable for all debts contracted
by or for the estate, and to narrow this statement down to the collection
of attorney's fees, we have found that the weight of authority seems to
rest the same way.
First, let us take into consideration the authorities holding that the
administrator and executor of an estate are personally liable for all debts
contracted for or by the estate. We find that in 57 Cal. 238, 38 Cal. 85,
47 N. Y. 360, 105 N. Y. 488, and 45 N. Y. 306, that the authority of a
personal representative to employ such persons as it may seem necessary
for him to employ, to enable him to perform his duties to the estate
which he represents and to pay for their services out of the funds of the
estate in his hands, is undoubted, but it is generally held that such a contract of employment does not create any obligation on the estate, and
that the only remedy of the person employed is against the personal
representative individually. This principle is applicable to the employment of attorneys and counsels also; and in 57 Cal. 238 and 2 Robt. (N.
Y.) 385, the courts held that "an attorney employed by the administrator
of an estate has no claim against the estate, although his services may
have enured to the benefit of the estate. He must look for compensation
to the administrator who employed him." Likewise, in 41 N. Y. 315 the
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court holds: "It is well settled that executors who employ attorneys in
respect to the affairs of their estates are personally liable for such services and cannot be made liable in their representative capacity. Claims
for such services therefore are not claims against the estate, but claims
against the executor personally."
The rule is well settled that an executory contract of an executor or
administrator if made on a new and independent consideration, moving
between the promisee and executor or administrator as promisor is his
personal contract, and does not, in the absence of authority given by
statute or by the will of the decedent, bind the estate, though the consideration moving for the promisee is such that the executor or administrator could properly have paid for the assets and been allowed for in
settlement of his accounts.-8 S. & R. 462, 14 Pa. 352, 20 Pa. 214, 12
Phila. 231. So inflexible is the rule, denying to personal representatives
the power to bind by an original contract the estate committed to their
charge, that its application is not affected by the fact that the contract
was made, or the debt incurred, for the benefit of the estate.-American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. II, page 935, section 15.
The above is undoubtedly the law in Pennsylvania, so far as contracts
made with third parties and for attorneys. The contract in question is
not an executory contract, or one which requires something to be done in
the future; but this contract has been executed, and for its execution
the attorney, Saxton, claims his fee of $800. In examining the cases as
cited above, we find that the contracts made by the executors and administrators were made with third persons, and made for the benefit of
the estates, but none of the cases, so far as we recall, are similar in
any respect to the case at bar. In these cases the executors and administrators contracted with creditors and third persons, but in no case were
the contracts made with attorneys, and this fact, in our opinion, puts
a different phase on the question.
In Arkansas a personal representative is authorized by statute to employ counsel in certain cases by leave of court, and the statute provides
that "when it shall become necessary in the opinion of the court for an
executor or administrator to employ an attorney to prosecute any suit
brought by or against such executor or administrator, the attorney's fees
shall be paid as expenses of the administrator. "-35 Ark. 267; American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. II, page 936, note 2.
These principles, as to the employment of attorneys and counsel by the
executors and administrators of estates and their compensation, are not
all uniform in denying to the executor and administrator the power to
bind the estate by such contract of employment, as they are in regard to
other classes of employment, and through our examination of the different cases we are of the opihion that the state of Pennsylvania is one of
the exceptions in regard to this.
In deciding this question, the court has been influenced, not alone by
the equity of this case, but mainly through the decision found in P. & L.
Digest of Decision under the head of "Attorney's Fees." There a review of the cases show that an attorney may look to the estate for his
compensation, and consequently, taking into consideration these decisions
and an examination of them, we must decide accordingly.
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In an accounting to the Orphans' Court, the administrator of an estate claimed credit for fees paid an attorney, who was employed by him
for matters connected with the estate. This claim was opposed by a
creditor, but the court allowed the claim.-Lafferty's Estate, 23 Pitts. L.
J., 157. In 5 Kulp 17 (Francis' Estate), an attorney employed by all
the heirs of a decedent but one, to prosecute the administratrlx for an
account and distribution, filed a bill for compensation out of the estate.
The charge was allowed by the auditor and exception taken, but the
court confirmed the report. In 6 Pa. C. C. 159, the court held that
''an attorney-at-law is entitled to compensation out of the estate of a
lunatic, for services for the benefit of the estate." In Scott's Estate,
9 W. & S. 98, the Supreme Court said in this case: "It is not doubted
that the fee paid to counsel was a reasonable and proper compensation,
and the question is whether the executor or the Charity shall bear the
charge of it. An executor is bound to prove the will and certainly not at
his own expense. When he meets with obstruction it is his duty to vemove it, if he can, and he is unfaithful when he omits to attempt it. The
executor litigated not for his own interest but for the interest of the
party who got the whole estate by the litigation, and now refuses to reimburse him his expenses." What the Supreme Court said of the above
case, we can say of the present case at bar.
Vol. 1 of Browne's "The Law of Decedents' Estates in Pennsylvania."-Where an estate is so situated, that legal advice is requisite to
direct the course of the executor, or where they must bring or defend
suits, counsel must be employed, and the estate must pay their fees if
reasonable.
When fixing the allowance of counsel fees for an executor, regard
should be had to the labor and services performed, and the advantage to
the estate. The sum involved and the value of the estate should be considered. In the present case, regard has been had to the labor done and
services performed, and the advantage to the estate, and according to
the evidence, the compensation of $800, demanded by Saxton, was a reasonable fee. Ames has been discharged as a bankrupt, and if Saxton
was a creditor of Ames, he could take pro-ratably with the other creditors of Ames; but he is not a creditor of Ames, but a creditor of the esTherefore, if a decedent's estate retate for which Ames is executor.
ceives the benefit of an attorney's services with the approval of the
executor, a reasonable compensation will be allowed the attorney out of
the estate.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The question before us is not whether the executor can create a liability of the estate for attorney's fees. He may employ an attorney
when such employment is necessary, and paying him a reasonable fee,
may demand credit for the payment, when he settles his account. -Ammon's Appeal, 31 Pa. 311; Groff's Estate, 215 Pa. 586, and many other
eases.
When an attorney renders proper service to the estate, at the instance of the executor, he may, as creditor, in propria persona
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and not merely through the executor, claim payment in the Orphans'
Court, citing the executor to file his account; Wilson's Appeal, 3 Walker
216, and directly sharing in the fund shown by the account to be in the
executor's hands. - Wilson's Appeal, supra, Shoenberger's Estate, 211
Pa. 99; Cook's Estate, 1 Phila. 408. Cf. Webb's Estate, 33 Super 41.
The question is whether a contract made by the executor with an
attorney, in behalf of the estate, will support an action at law against
the executor, as such, an action eventuating in a judgment de bonis testatoris. In an early case so able a judge as Tilghman, C. J., laid down
the principle that "in all cases of promises, express or implied, made to
or by, an administrator, after the death of the intestate, the action lies
for or against the administrator personally."-Grier v. Huston, 8 S. &
R. 402. Money or property may be properly procured, sonetimes, by
the executor for the benefit of the estate, but a note given by him for
the money borrowed, or for the price of the property, will be his personal note, and only he, as an individual, can be sued upon it.-Orne v.
Ritchie, 12 Phila. 231; Williamson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 231; Farmers' Nat.
Bank v. Griel, 12 Lanc. 28; also 21 Lanc. 170. The doubt upon this point
expressed by Rogers, J., in Seip v. Darrach, 14 Pa. 352, must be attributed to a transient lapse of the judicial thinking power.
There is no material difference between beneficially procuring money
or other property and beneficially procuring services for the estate. The
former is useful; so is the latter. The former is worth money; so is the
latter. Saxton's skill and labor have possibly saved the estate $2,550.
The Orphans' Court might find them worth $800, and allow that amount
to Saxton even if the executor did not ask credit for it.-Schoenberger'sEstate, 211 Pa. 99. It might also, not finding the service worth $800,
allow less, while Saxton could nevertheless recover $800 upon his contract with the executor as an individual.
The impossibility of collecting $800 from the executor, as a man, because of his bankruptcy, cannot create a right to sue him as executor. The
Orphans' Court is open to him for a claim against the estate, but from
that circumstance cannot be inferred that the Common Pleas is open to
him.
The allowance of a suit in either court, upon debts created by the deceased himself, leads occasionally to incongruities. It cannot be said to be
unreasonable to limit to one of these courts the pursuit of claims springing into existence since the death of the testator, by the act of the executor. So far as Saxton has Ames' personal contract to pay him $800, or
Ames' personal contract that the estate shall pay him $800, he may sue
Ames in the Common Pleas. If he desires to enforce a liability of the
estate, thus created byAmes, he has a sufficient opportunity to do so in
the Orphans' Court.
A note for the fee, though signed by Ames as executor, would have
been treated as his personal note.-Geyer v. Smith, 1 DalL. 347; Claghorn's Estate, 181 Pa. 610.
The plaintiff might have amended his action and declaration by striking out all words indicating that he was suing the executor, as such, with
a view to recovering a judgment de bonis testatoris. He has not done so.
The able and carefully written opinion of the learned Court below
leaves us unconvinced that the action can be sustained.
Judgment reversed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

COMMONWEALTH V. SMITHSON.
Manslaughter-

Officer Killed While Attempting Illegally to
Arrest Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Garnett, a police officer, attempted to arrest Smithson illegally.
Smithson attempted to run away, and Garnett drew his pistol, aimed it at
Smithson and told him that if he did not halt he would kill him. Smithson did not stop but drew his pistol and killed Garnett.
CONWAY, for Commonwealth.
STAFFORD, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
R. B. SMITH, J.-The counsel for the prisoner in the case at hand
claims him to be guilty of nothing more or less than excusable homicide.
Or, in other words, the prisoner has committed no crime at all. An excusable homicide means the killing of a human being, either by misadventure or in self-defense. The prisoner certainly did not kill Garnett by
misadventure, that is, by an accident.
The question then is: did Smithson kill Garnett in self-defense? Selfdefense is the protection of one's person and property. A man may defend himself when attacked, repel force by force, and even commit a
homicide in resisting an attempted felony. Conceding for the present
that the prisoner did kill Garnett in self-defense, we will look at the law
on this point.
It has been held in this state in 160 Pa. 451 and 209 Pa. 274, that
homicide committed in self-defense is excusable; but to justify homicide
in self-defense there must not only be active, imminent peril of life or
great bodily harm, or a reasonable belief of such peril founded on facts
as they appear at the time, but also no other means of escape. In the
case at hand, did the prisoner use up every possible means of escape? No,
it cannot be said that he did; and be was, at time of commission of the
crime, attempting to escape being placel under illegal arrest, or Garnett
would not have drawn his pistol. It has been held in various cases that
the accused must have acted as an ordinarily cautious and courageous
man would have acted; or, in other words, there must have been a reasonable appearance of danger, or reasonable grounds to believe there
was danger.-101 Pa. 332.
Clark (page 181) on Criminal Law, states: "A person must not be
guilty of negligence in coming to the conclusion that he was in danger.
Under such circumstances the homicide will be manslaughter." We
think the rule as stated by court in 44 Alabama 41, "That a person should submit to an illegal arrest and afterwards seek redress from a
court of law," fits the present case. Measuring by above-stated rule,
and other authorities cited, we think that prisoner showed negligence in
killing Garnett, and in doing so did not act in self-defense.
The question that next presents itself, after disposing of the question of self-defense is: What is the prisoner guilty of ?
Trickett, in Pennsylvania Criminal Law, Vol. II, page 858, states
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that "the arrest of an innocent man for a crime without warrant is a
great provocation. If in frenzy of passion he loses his self-control and
kills his assailant, his homicide will be but manslaughter." Manslaughter
is the unlawful- killing of a human being without malice, express or implied.
In Commonwealth v. Salyard, 158 Pa. 501, the Court, in affirming a
point of the prisoner, stated. "It not having been shown that Martin
(deceased officer) had a warrant of arrest for prisoner, and not having
been alleged or proven that prisoner was, at time of the killing, in act of
commission of any felony, . . if the jury believe from evidence in case
that killing was done in resisting arrest, then, in absence of all other
evidence of circumstances attending the killing, they would not be justified in finding a higher grade than of manslaughter." In this case it
seems there had been attempted illegal arrest.
In case at bar we do not believe that prisoner knew that arrest was
anything else but illegal, for if he did, the crime would be murder. For in
such a case the accused would not, knowing the arrest to be legal, have
any provocation to kill.-Graham v. State, 28 Texas App. 582. From the
law within stated and cited, the court finds that the prisoner may
properly be convicted of manslaughter.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The Court below has properly held that the killing of Garnett could
not be justified by the plea of self-defense. Smithson was threatened
with arrest, detention for a comparatively short time, and a public examination before a justice of the peace. That Smithson apprehended, or had
reason to apprehend, anything worse, does not appear. In order to avoid
these slight inconveniences and annoyances, he has intentionally killed
Garnett. Human life is not of so little account that for these reasons it
can lawfully be extinguished.
The trial court has magnanimously shielded Smithson from conviction of murder, by instructing the jury that the utmost crime of which he
could be found guilty was voluntary manslaughter. A conviction for
voluntary manslaughter has followed, and the defendant appeals. The
authorities sanction the view that "a homicide committed in resisting
unlawful arrest is manslaughter and not murder. "-McLean, 1 Crim.
Law, 309; 1 Wharton, Crim. Law, p. 412; 2 Bishop, Crim. Law, p. 399.
The defendant cannot successfully complain that he has been convicted
of manslaughter.
But, had it an appeal, might not the Commonwealth complain of
the instruction of the trial court? An intentional killing becomes, when
not in self-defense, less than murder only when it follows upon "a provocation" which engenders "heat of blood," "sudden passion," "sudden
transport of passion," "a state of rage orpassion," "a sudden heat and
passion."-Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 353; 2 Trickett, Crimes, p.
869. The evidence is entirelybare of intimation that the state of mind
thus described, existed in Smithson when he perpetrated the killing
In Brooks v. Commonwealth, Agnew, J., remarked:
of Garnett.
"But if the arrest were illegal, it does not follow that the crime was
necessarily manslaughter. There remained still the question on the
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evidence, whether the killing was without malice and arose solely from a
sudden heat and passion upon the illegal arrest." He observes on the
case before him, "The killing was evidently not the result of anger
and hot blood, growing out of an unwarranted assault on the persons of
the prisoners. It was prompted by wickedness of heart and a consciousness of guilt," etc.
The text writers cited suprarecognize that even one unlawfully arrested may slay the arresting person maliciously and thus commit murder.
"Where no adequate provocation exists, or where no passion or heat of
blood results, the wilful slayer cannot extenuate his cool and deliberate
act of killing by the pretense that he had a right to be in a passion. "Dalvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283 (Tenn.)
Cf. Noles v. State, 26 Ala. 31,
where a conviction of murder in the first degree, of one who killed the
person who attempted to arrest him, was sustained. See, also, Rafferty
v, People, 69 Ill. 111; 72 Ill.
37. The absence of evidence of passion,
other than that of the murderous act of the defendant, might have justified a finding that the act was malicious; was murder of the first degree.
When a policeman arrests a man, he has reason to suspect that the
policeman believes himself entitled to arrest him; that he is acting in
good faith; and that, if the arrest is improperly made, that fact will soon
be discovered and he set at liberty. The law gives him remedies for any
wrong done him; ai action for assault and battery; an action for false
arrest, etc. We fail to see how mere arrest can engender in a normal
mind that wonderful thing called "heat of blood," etc. It is more likely
in normal men to awaken mortification and humiliation; in the atrocious
and unsocial mind, revenge, desire to exterminate. The prisoner is
probably a person of exaggerated self-appreciation, feeling that an arrest is a species of lese-majesty, worthy of instant and condign punishment, and this state of mind we shall find it extremely difficult to discriminate from malice, hate, readiness for a slight humiliation even innocently imposed, to destroy life.
Garnett showed a purpose to complete his arrest. He may have believed a felony committed, and Smithson the felon. He gave Smithson
the option to submit or to die. We find nothing in this stern resolution
of the deceased to justify or even to mitigate the homicide. It still remains true that Smithson could have submitted to the arrest, at the
small cost of a transient inconvenience, and rather than do this, was
willing to destroy Garnett's life.
Jfdgment affirmed.
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PHILLIPS V. JAMISON
Ejectment-Covenant of General Warranty--Adverse Possession
by Grantor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jamison conveyed land in 1880 to Phillips with deed of general warranty. The next year Jamison took possession of the land without
Phillip's knowledge and has retained it ever since, intending to hold it as
his own, if he were not dispossessed within 21 years. In this ejectment
brought in 1909, Janaison sets up the Statute of Limitations-Phillips
asserts, that his warranty precludes his availing himself of an after acquired
title.
HICKS, for Plaintiff.
JACKSON, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SMITH, J.-Thirty years ago from the beginning of this action
Jamison conveyed land to Phillips with deed of general warrenty but the
next year took possession of the land without the knowledge of Phillips.
Since which time he has retained possession, intending to hold it as his
own if not dispossessed within twenty-one years. Has there been the
adverse possession required by the Statute of Limitations, and if so, is or
is not Jamison, because of his general warranty deed; estopped from setting up the Statute?
It does not appear that Jamison went in under any color of title, but
this is not necessary to establish adverse possession for where there is an
actual possession and an intention to hold adversely the possession need
not be under color of title in order that the Statute should operate. Overfield v. Christie, 7 S. & R. 17; Munshower v. Patton. 10 S. & R. 334.
It appears that Jamison entered and held possession without the knowledge of Phillips but knowledge by the true owner of the adverse entry is
not essential in order to make the possession adverse. -Lodge v. Patterson, 3 Watts 74.
That there has been an adverse possession is conceded by the counsel
for the plaintiff but his argument is to the effect that the general warranty embraces the covenant for quiet enjoyment and that defendant's
possession is an interference with quiet enjoyment, that the plaintiff's
actions impeach his deed, and that such is the relation existing between
them that the claim he now asserts is inequitable.
The general warranty covenant may be termed the Sweeping Covenant.
As a rule it is so worded as to obligate the grantor to "Warrant and defend
the granted premises against the claims of all persons whatsoever." It
is the oldest of all covenants and existed before written deeds, and it was
the only covenant that the feudal lord made with his men. If the title
to the land failed, the lord was obliged to give his man an equal quantity
of land of the same value. It followed that if any one claimed the land
against the tenant, it was the duty of the tenant to notify the lord so that
he might come in and defend.
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The general warranty covenant is a covenant for quiet enjoyment
and something more. It is a covenant to defend both the premises and
the estate in the land. It gives the grantee the right to call on the
grantor to make such defense in case of an adverse claim. If the title is
not perfect and it is possible for the covenantor to make it so afterwards, he will make it perfect. If he obtains or can obtain any outstanding title, he agrees to procure that title and convey it to the garantee.
It follows that if the covenantor becomes possessed afterwards of a
certain interest he will not be allowed to show that he in fact did not at
the time have such interest but such interest will be regarded as being
held in trust for the grantee.
"While the continued possession of land by the grantor thereof after
the execution of a deed is presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary to be in subordination to the title of the grantee, it is none the
less true that the conveyance does not of itself prevent the grantor from
acquiring title by adverse possession against the grantee. "-Cyc.of Law,
Col. 1040; Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts 289. "There is nothing in the
relation of the vendor and vendee by deed executed and not executory
which will prevent the vendee who may remain in possession, or who may
afterwards take possession, from claiming adversely and relying on the
Statute of Limitations. "-Cyc. of Law, Col. 1040; Watson v. Gregg 10
Watts 289. "The covenant of warranty contained in the deed will not
defeat title by limitations acquired after the deed. Such title is no breach
of covenant which cannot be extended to cover future laches of the
grantee whereby he loses the title conveyed t- him.-Cyc. of Law, Col.
1040; 9 Cush. 497.
From the law just quoted we can readily see that there are some
circumstances under which the grantee can be disseized by his own
grantor as well as by a third person. A grantor may, through acts, divesting the grantee of his interest in the premises, come into possession of
title again. In the case at bar full effect is given to the deed to Phillips,
and Jamison would be held estopped from setting up any title as then
held adversely; but by his own acts Phillips has allowed a perfectly good
title to lapse and it is no answer to the alleged disseissen that Jamison
previous to his entry and *commencement of adverse possession fully acknowledged the title of Phillips. Jamison was a mere trespasser and no
fiduciary relation existed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
There are many cases which state generally that there is nothing in
the relation of grantor and grantee which will prevent the grantor from
subsequently acquiring title by adverse possession.-Watson v. Gregg, 10
Watts 289; Olwine v. Holman, 23 Pa. 279;, Inglis v. Inglis 159 Pa. 401;
Buckholder v. Seyler'7 W. and S. 154; 1 Cyc. 1039; where cases are
collected.
In a number of these cases there is nothing to show whether the
grantor's deed was a warranty deed or not, but whenever the question
was raised it was uniformly held that a grantor in a warranty deed may
by adverse possession subsequently initiated acquire title to the premises
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even as against the grantee or his privees.-See 23. L. R. A. N. S. 129
where the authorities are collected. This is the rule in Pennsylvania.
"The statute makes no exception of a vendor in a deed of warranty."
"The doctrine that a grantor with warranty may originate a possession
adverse to his grantee is well established."
Milnes v. Vangilder, 197 Pa.
347; Connor v. Bell, 152 Pa. 447.
The rule that any title afterwards acquired by a grantor in a warranty deed, insures to the benefit of his grantee is applicable only to
titles existing and outstanding at the time of the deed, and does not extend to titles subsequently originating either by the grantee's acts or his
laches.-Cyc. 1040.
The sole remaining question is whether the possession of Jamison was
adverse. It is well settled that "a vendor after a conveyance and before
delivery of possession is to be regarded as a trustee for the vendee so far
as regards the possession" and that "if he wislhes to change the character of his possession he must manifest his intention by some act of
hostility to the vendee, plainly indicating his intention to deny his right
and to hold adversely toit."-Olwine v. Holman, 23 Pa. 279; Conor v. Bell,
152 Pa. 448; Ingles v. Ingles, 150 Pa. 397; Milnes v. Vangilder, 197 Pa.
347.
The doctrine of these cases is not, however, applicable to the present
case. The grantor in the present case did not retain possession but took
possession a year after the conveyance "intending to hold the property as
his own." There was nothing to warrant the presumption that he
entered under the grantee or as a trustee for him. It was not his business or duty to enter and keep possession for the grantee. He was in no
relation to the grantee that implied any confidence or trust. He entered
the land intending to hold it as his own and the effect of his entry was
the same as if the entry had been made by a third person.-See Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts 293.. So considered, the opinion of the learnedcourt below shows that it was sufficient to initiate a title by adverse
possession.
In Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts 289, it appeared that a vendor after
a conveyance in fee entered upon the land. In a suit in which the vendor
attempted to set up a title by adverse possession the court held, "The
entry of the vendor must be taken to have been adverse to the title of
the vendees in absence of any evidence that he entered for them or held
under them."
In Pipher v. Lodge, 16 S. and R. 234, in which persons claiming under
the vendor set up title by adverse possession the court said: "Viewing
all the circumstances of that entry by the grantor and the subsequent
possession of himself and his devisees, if all these matters do not amount
to an actual ouster but only to what is called a trust, a mere trust unprotected by any length of possession or by the act of limitations, then there
can be no circumstances under which the statute can with certainty be
said to protect any possession."
Judgment affirmed.
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WM.MAPLE V. BOROUGH OF OXFORD
Trespass for Personal Injuries-Contributory Negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The borongh was causing water pipes to be laid in street A. which was
excavated. Barriers were put across the road, at a distance of twelve
(12) feet from the excavation, but no lights indicated the barriers. On
a dark night Maple was riding in an automobile, belonging to his friend
who was operating it. It was going at the rate of ten (10) miles an
hour. The barriers not being seen, there being no lights on the vehicle,
the automobile ran into it, and pushed it for twelve feet, before the
vehicle could be stopped. It ran into the excavation, was overturned,
and Maple was injured. He sues the borough for damages, $400 for
injuries, because of the negligence of the borough.
BRENNAN for Plaintiff.
HANKEE for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
FOLEY, J.-To the court, the facts here presented set forth a clear
case, the question being whether, Mr. Maple was guilty of contributory
negligence, that negligence which co-operates in causing the injury and
which bars a recovery for the injury. The rule is laid down by
Justice Hand in 122 Pa. 463, to the effect that any degree of negligence
on the part of the plaintiff contributing to the injury, destroys his right
to recover. It is the kind of action, not the quality on the part of the
plaintiff which prevents the law from measuring between plaintiff and
defendant their respective degrees of negligence, when the former comes
into a court of justice. We also have the legal principle, that contributory negligence will defeat recovery even though the negligent act consisted in the violation of a statute or ordinance.
With the above principles in mind, we read the act of April, 1903,
Section 5, which provides: "No person or persons shallbe allowed to use,
operate, or drive any motor vehicle as aforesaid upon any of the public
highways of the cities, boroughs, counties, or townships of the commonwealth at a greater speed than eight (8) miles an hour within the corporate limits of any of the cities or boroughs, etc." Section 8 reads:
"Every such automobile shall carry during the period from one (1) hour
after sunset, to one (1) hour before sunrise, at least two lighted lamps,
showing white lights visible at least 100 ft. in the direction towards
which such automobile is proceeding and shall also exhibit one light visible in the reverse direction." We have here an automobile being used
by Mr. Maple in the words of the statute. We also have here an automobile being used by Mr. Maple without any lights, and going at an excessiVerate of speed; I will not consider this extra two miles per hour
however in deciding this case.
Counsel for the plaintiff has sought to impress me with the Borough
of Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544, as entitling the plaintiff in this action
to a recovery. This case has been thoroughly gone into in 9 District
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and I feel as though further discussion by me at this time can add nothing in showing where that case and the one at bar differs as to the guest's
right of action. However I will endeavor to distinguish the cases.
The Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane was a case in which the facts
were not unlike those in this case under review with the exception,
however, of one particular, which we must regard as important and to
which we will later advert. It appeared that the borough was engaged in
macadamizing the road. Brisbane, a stranger in the town. was taken by
his friend in a sleigh to visit the poor-house in the afternoon, when ground
was covered with snow, and in the evening was driven back along said
road referred to. There was nothing to give warning of an obstruction.
The driver took to the middle, sleigh overturned and Brisbane was injured. He was found entitled to recover. By way of defence, the borough offered to show facts from which contributory negligence in driver
might be imputed to Brisbane and court rejected offer because the driver
was not a common carrier.
Subsequently, a point of charge was presented in behalf of-defendant
to which trial Judge Sadler made reply in part as follows:
"The failure of Cornman to drive with ordinary care would not of
itself prevent a recovery by plaintiff (under the relation which has been
shown to have existed between him and -the former.) The negligence
of Mr. Cornman, (the driver) is not to be imputed to the plaintiff if the
latter acted as a reasonably prudent man' would have acted under like
circumstances. But we instruct you that [if the plaintiff by the exercise
of ordinary care could have seen that a portion of North St. was undergoing repair, and that portion was not fit for travel and at the junction of
said street with the Poor-house road,- a safe and easy road was provided
and opened on said street for travel and this was so well marked that no
person in the exercise of ordinary prudence could have failed to see it by
twilight or moonlight, then it was his duty if he had the time after
making such observation to have interfered and changed the direction in
which Mr. Cornman was driving his sleigh or secured its stoppage
before the accident occurred; if he failed to do so he was guilty of -contributory negligence and could not recover.]
The particular in respect of which the Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane, differs in its facts from case at bar is indicated in that part of the
charge above quoted 'which is in brackets.
In case at bar we are assured that Maple and his friend, did not act,
as reasonaly prudent men would have acted under the circumstances.
Surely reasonably prudent men would have lights on their automobile,
forgetting for the time, also, that they were exceeding the speed limit as
prescribed bystatute. We think the facts as disclosed, justify conclusion,
that unlike Brisbane, Maple had notice that an accident might happen
at any moment and that it was his duty to do what was reasonably prudent and in his power to prevent the driver of the car from subjecting him
to the jeopardy, which resulted in his injury.-Lohman v. McManus, 9
Dist. 223, to the same effect.
As before intimated we concede that the negligence of the driver
was not imputable to Maple.--Carr v. City of Easton, 142 Pa. 139. We
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then have the sole remaining question whether there was contributory
negligence on the part of Maple, himself, so clearly shown by the evidence,
that I may as a matter of law direct a verdict for the defendant. It is
entirely settled that this may be done in a clear case, but in a clear case
only.
In Crescent Twp v. Anderson, 114 Pa. 643, there was a small gully or
ravine across the public road, over which travelers ordinarily crossed by
the bridge. Plaintiff driving with her father found the bridge impassable,
the flooring having been torn up for repair; and her father then drove
through the ravine at the side of the bridge and in so doing the spring
catch of the wagon seat broke and plaintiff was thrown out and injured.
It was held that though the plaintiff was not affected by the negligence
of the driver, yet as she had voluntarily joined in testing a patent danger,
she was barred as a matter of law by her own contributory negligence.
Another case in point is Jean v. R. R. Co., 129 Pa. 514, where the
same rule was applied to plaintiff who riding with a neighbor in the latter's wagon neither stopped, looked, or listened, nor requested the driver
to do so at a railroad crossing.
The essential point in these cases was the patent character of the
danger and in the latter, in addition, the violation of a fixed rule of law
as to the duty of travelers in crossing a railroad, this constituting clear
legal negligence.
As I said at the beginning, the case seems clear and I think I can
safely lay down the doctrine, that where one person is driving with another for the mutual pleasure of both, with opportunity to see and equal
ability to appreciate the danger and should in fact be looking out for
himself, but makes no effort to avoid the danger, such person is chargeable with want of care which results in his injury.
As regards the negligence of the defendant, I might say that "in
building sewers or digging trenches for gas pipes, municipality must put
barriers or lights around or near the excavation, so as to prevent walking
or driving into it" (Trickett, Borough Law), and that in this case the city
had used the barrier; but as to whether or not the city was negligent in
not putting up lights, I deem it not necessary to go into the question, in
that the want of lights on the automobile was the proximate cause of
the injury.
Judgment accordingly, for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Though there are decisions to the contrary, the great weight of
authority, including that of the courts of Pennsylvania, is to the effect
that the negligence of a driver of a private conveyance will not be imputed to a person riding with him but having no authority or control
over him.-29 Cyc. 549; Little v. Central Dist. Co., 211 Pa. 229; Jones v.
Lehigh Co., 202 Pa. 81; Dean v. R. R., 129 Pa. 514; Finnegan v. Foster
Township, 163 Pa. 135; Carr v. Easton, 142 Pa. 139. "When a person is
injured by the negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of one with whom the injured person was riding as a guest or com-
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panion the negligence of the driver is not imputable to the injured person."-7 A. and E. Encyc., 448 and cases supra.
The fact that a person is riding as the guest of another does not, however, relieve him of the duty of exercising due care, and a recovery by
him for injuries received will not be allowed if it appears that he was
personally negligent.-Little v. Telegraph Co., 211 Pa. 237; Dean v. R.
R., 142 Pa. 139; Crescent Township v. Anderson, 114 Pa 463; Carr V.
Easton, 142 Pa. 142.
Was Maple guilty of contributory negligence? When the facts are
undisputed and but one reasonable inference can be drawn from them
the question of contributory negligence is one of law for the court. Although the facts are undisputed the question is for the jury when fairminded persons may reasonably arrive at different conclusions thereon.
But when the court can say from the evidence that ordinarily intelligent,
reasonable, and fair-minded men would not and ought not to believe that
the plaintiff was acting as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted
under the circumstances, the question of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence is one of law for the court. -Baker v. Lehr, 97 Pa. 70; L. V.
R. R. v. Greener, 113 Pa. 600; R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Pa. 425.
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case we reach
the conclusion that the learned court was right in deciding that Maple
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The night was dark; Maple must have known this. It is beyond the
range of possibility that one could travel in an automobile on a dark
night without knowing that it was dark unless he were blind. The machine was traveling at the rate of 10 miles an hour. Although passing
objects may not have been discernible, the vibrations of the car, the frequency of the explosions of the engine, the pressure of the air upon his
face would necessarily indicate to Maple the approximate rate at which
the car was traveling. The car carried no lights. We do not believe that
it is possible for one to travel in an automobile at night without knowing
that the machine carries no lights if such is the case.
It seems to us, and we decide, that a person who knowingly rides in
an automobile which is not carrying lights and which is traveling at the
rate of 10 miles an hour through the streets of a town on a dark night is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. We believe that
ordinarily intelligent, reasonable, fair-minded men could draw but one
inference from these facts.
In Little v. Telegraph Co., 211 Pa. 237, the plaintiff was injured
while riding in a wagon driven by another and it was held that the question whether he was exercising due care was for the jury to determine.
unless the dangerwas so apparent that a reasonably prudent man would
not have taken the risk. In that event the court may hold him negligent
as a matter of law."
The decision of the court is rendered without reference to the statutes
quoted in the brief of the counsel for the defendant for it is well settled
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that the fact that the person injured was at the time of the injury engaged in a violation of the law does not constitute contributory negligence
per se.-7 A and E. Ency., 401; Mohney v. Cook, 26 Pa. 342; Ganson vw
Wilson, 18 W. N. C. 7.
Judgment affirmed.

